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Pragmatism and the 
Analysis of Meaning 
in the Philosophy of 
Giovanni Vailati 
Robert E. Innis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Giovanni Vailati's premature death in 1909, at the age of forty-
six, silenced a distinctive and original voice in Italian philosophy. 
In his work, so different in tone and method from Croce's idealism 
and anti-scientism, we find reflected and developed most of the 
great problems and themes which have come to the fore in twen-
tieth-century philosophy and semiotics. In spite of his remarkable 
linguistic skills, encompassing both modern and classical Ian-
This essay is taken from part one of my book, Giovanni Vailati: 
Pragmatism and the Analysis of Meaning, to be published in the Foundations 
of Semiotics series by John Benjamins in Amsterdam. The book will also 
contain translations of Vailati's most important essays on pragmatism 
and language theory. A shorter, preliminary version was read at the 
American Association for Italian Studies Annual Conference, held at the 
University of Lowell, MA, April 14, 1989. 
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guages, Vailati's philosophical orientation did not derive directly 
from the Italian humanist tradition nor from the Idealist traditions 
of German transcendental philosophy. Rather, Vailati was profes-
sionally trained in physics and mathematics and had been Peano's 
assistant at the University of Torino before becoming a teacher of 
mathematics in secondary schools. H. S. Thayer, in his classic 
Meaning and Context: A Critical History of Pragmatism, 1 said of Vailati 
that 
his work displays a meeting of intellectual currents that were to 
determine the later character of modem philosophy: Peirce's prag-
matism and his interest in signs and the analysis of concepts; the 
interest of the Vienna Circle, 1923, in formulating the methodology 
of verification and a criterion of meaningful (i.e., the cognitive use 
of) language; the mathematical, critical, and analytical investiga-
tions of language, logic, and science by Ramsey and Wittgenstein. 
(332-33) 
Into his work-as well as into that of Peirce's, with which it 
has an intimate theoretical as well as historical connection-flowed 
many of the chief problems and concerns of the whole history of 
philosophy and of the sciences, particularly the natural sciences, 
and out of it emerged a set of heuristically fertile insights and 
proposals that not only anticipated many later discussions and 
problems, but still have relevance and importance for our present 
situation. 
Vailati's philosophical project was nourished most of all by 
a deep immersion in the history and methods of the exact sci-
ences-especially the history of mechanics and the history of 
mathematics as paradigms of the deductive sciences-and by a 
recognition of the revolutionary importance of pragmatism and 
of the turn toward the analysis of meaning and language that was 
one of its central foci. His posthumously collected Scritti, edited 
by Mario Calderoni, Umberto Ricci, and Giovanni Vacca (Leipzig 
and Florence: Barthes and Seeber, 1911), which includes almost 
all his published work (the Scritti has 213 entries), displays a range 
of concern, reading, and reference that bears witness to a 
philosophical culture of the highest caliber. Vailati's correspon-
dence, a substantial selection of which can be found in his Epis-
tolario, edited by Giorgio Lanaro (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), displays 
an extraordinary range of contacts, including exchanges with Vil-
fredo Pareto, Ernst Mach, Lady Welby, Franz Brentano, Benedetto 
Croce, Mario Calderoni, and many others. 2 
My highly selective and introductory discussion will be limited 
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here to the themes of Vailati's percipient, pragmatically oriented 
analysis of modern science from an epistemological, linguistic, 
and sense-critical point of view, and his exploration of language 
from a critical, analytical, and constructive point of view. The 
overarching matrix is Vailati's pragmatism, the inner bond that 
connects him with that epochal movement in American philosophy, 
and with the relatively short-lived Italian continuation and de-
velopment of pragmatism in the work of Papini, Calderoni, and 
others who collaborated on the Florentine journal Leonardo during 
those fateful years in the first decade of this century, before the 
overpowering presences of Croce and Gentile took their toll upon 
the diversity of Italian philosophical culture. 
2. SCIENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF DEDUCTION 
(ARISTOTLE, GALILEO, PEIRCE, BERKELEY) 
The core of Vailati' s analysis and evaluation of the significance 
of modern science, the topic of his spellbinding essay "11 metodo 
deduttivo come strumento di ricerca" (SF: 59-92), lies in his thesis 
that the rise of the modern mathematical natural sciences effected 
a pivotal change in the ideal of deduction as a means of knowing. 
When Aristotle, Vailati thought, considered the nature and scope 
of deduction, he had in mind for the most part deduction in 
geometrical demonstrations or in rhetorical argumentations. What 
they had in common was their focusing upon a privileged set of 
premises or axioms, which were more certain and necessary, and 
their use as foundations and bases for the increase of certitude 
that would result from the deduction of sets of conclusions from 
them. A properly conceived deductive method transmitted cer-
titude from premises to conclusions. Both processes-the strictly 
formal one of geometry and the more informal one of rhetoric-
were subject to derailment due to the illusions deriving from the 
imperfections of ordinary language, or from what Vailati also called 
"il linguaggio comune" (SF: 62). Deduction was to help us to avoid 
[evitare] these illusions and to facilitate [facilitare] reasoning processes 
through long chains. 
The distinctiveness of the classical view of deduction, in ad-
dition to its concern with certitude, was exemplified in the 
privileged role played by the premises. They were to be taken as 
"given," while deduction itself would show, through inferential 
processes, what conclusions were in agreement with them. In 
cases of conflict with alternative conclusions resulting from other 
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deductive processes, our own premises, as embedded in "linguag-
gio comune" or "linguaggio ordinario," were authoritative. This 
was ultimately the root of the classical reliance upon the "argument 
from authority," potentiated to an incredible degree by the Schol-
astics for whom deduction was first and foremost a "good conduc-
tor" [buona conduttrice] of evidence and certitude (SF: 74). It was 
the overuse of this method as a support of dogmatism and 
traditionalism that caused Bacon to attack the deductive method 
as aprioristic and to oppose to it the ideal of a science based on 
induction and practical experiment. 
Galilean physics, however, did not wholeheartedly adopt the 
Baconian ideal. To be sure, Galileo proceeded deductively, but 
his goal was not certitude. Deduction for him, Vailati pointed out, 
was rather the means for the "explanation and anticipation of 
experience" [spiegazione  anticipazione sull'esperienza] (SF: 65). Vai-
lati attempted to encapsulate the radical difference exemplified in 
the working out of Galilean methods in a stupendous passage: 
The mental processes that make up the most essential part of the 
modern methods of explanation and of scientific research, taking, 
that is, by means of deduction, theories to their ultimate conse-
quences, for the purpose of confronting them with some fact known 
or eventually knowable to be incompatible with it, the utilization 
to the highest degree of every known law to see up to what point 
it suffices to give an account of all the particulars which are encoun-
tered in the facts in which its action is manifested and to establish 
what unexplained residuum it still leaves open to our further inves-
tigations, the combining of more laws for the purpose of using 
them in the analysis of a complicated single phenomenon, all of 
these operations, no one of which is possible without the help of 
deduction, appear to be completely foreign to the spirit of those 
first [scientific] investigators. The dislike of deduction in all the 
cases in which it is of no use to prove something of which one was 
first in doubt, the inability to avail oneself of it as a means to secure 
us against too hasty generalization, increasing in a certain way the 
points of contact between each theory and the facts from which it 
can await a confirmation or a contradiction, the lack of patience, 
and I would say as it were the lack of abnegation, necessary for 
drawing out accurately the consequences of hypotheses or princi-
ples less intuitive and less solid than those of geometry, laying 
oneself open to the risk of obtaining as a unique result of one's own 
efforts the conviction of having started from poorly grounded sup-
positions and of having to redo the same work by taking a different 
point of departure, not being satisfied with vague analogies, but 
pretending that the agreement, among the phenomena being com-
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pared, is verified down to the most minute particulars accessible 
to our senses or to the control of instruments and measurements, 
these are so many characters or marks that are connected to the 
same above indicated difference, that is, that between the old 
methods and those to which are due the instances of rapid progress 
of the physical sciences in the last three centuries. (SF: 71-72) 
Such is Vailati's delineation of the hypothetical-deductive 
method. It consists in "l'attitudine ... a meravigliarsi a proposito" 
[the ability ... to be amazed on purpose] (SF: 67), in the movement 
from the haphazard interrogation of nature to the provocation of 
nature, to subjecting it and the inquirer to risks. 
Later in his groundbreaking essay, Vailati offers us another 
ringing passage: 
It is this reduction of a fact, or of a law, to other more general laws 
or facts that constitutes what we call scientific explanation, and it is 
important to note how the advantages inhering in this process do 
not depend at all on the circumstances that the facts or the laws, 
upon which a given explanation is grounded, are presented to our 
mind as more familiar or more evident in themselves than those 
that we are explaining by means of them. Deduction, applied in 
such a way as a means of explanation, permits us to embrace, with 
one glance and with one single act of the mind, a variety and 
multiplicity of facts, the consideration of which would demand a 
quite large amount of operations and of distinct intellectual efforts. 
With its aid we manage to locate ourselves at a point of view from 
which the analogies, the relations, and the connections, among the 
phenomena that we are investigating, are explained to our intellect 
just as the topographical particularities of a region are offered to 
the view of one who contemplates them from a high point. Deduc-
tion multiplies in this way our abilities to perceive order, uniformity, 
constant laws in the midst of the tumultuous succession of facts 
and events, or, to say the same thing with an expression from Plato 
(Republic, Bk 7), it puts us in a position to discern the one in the midst 
of the many [to en pollois oron] and to discover with the eyes of the 
mind the immutable poles around which turn the chaos and the 
perpetual comings and goings of phenomena and of sensations. 
(SF: 87) 
Vailati thought of science in realist terms, in spite of his not 
infrequent admiring references to Mach's epistemology. What he 
shared with Mach, however, was a profound appreciation of the 
role of idealizzazioni semplificatrici in the construction of scientific 
theories: 
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The ease with which such simplifications lend themselves to bring-
ing us to new conclusions, by means of purely mental operations 
and independently of any direct examination of the concrete facts 
to which they refer, and the absolute uselessness of any appeal to 
these to guarantee the correctness of the deductions themselves, 
leads us sometimes to lose from view that requisite investigations 
must precede the application of the results obtained to real cases 
in order to establish whether, by means of them, the conditions 
are truly present that the theory supposes, whether, by means of 
them, that is, the influence of all those causes the theory has not 
taken into account is then really and truly able to be ignored. (SF: 91) 
The modern scientific process of deduction involves a mutual 
adjustment of theoretical idealization, chains of deductions, and 
the demands of experience itself. From an examination of the 
significance of the rise of mechanics, which for him was of funda-
mental epistemological importance, Vailati contended that con-
cepts are fundamentally instrumental in nature (SF: 55), that an 
intellectual combat of ideas takes place not just between thinkers 
but within each thinker (SF: 57), that there is an intrinsic aesthetic 
character to mechanics that turns theory-construction in this do-
main into a kind of "scientific poem" (SF: 58), so that coherence, 
symmetry, and coordination of ideas are marks of scientific and 
theoretical quality. The drive toward simplicity and economy that 
Vailati ascribes to the science of mechanics is really the drive 
toward system and is not to be thought of in strictly Machian 
terms. 
Further, Vailati was deeply impressed by Peirce's pragmatic 
analysis of meaning and by its connection with the development 
of the experimental sciences on the one hand and of mathematical 
logic on the other. The Peircean central contention was that the 
valore or significato of an assertion is to be found in the "practical" 
consequences (SF: 237) entailed by it and by its constituent terms. 
Vailati will give a faithful and clear account of this pragmatic 
maxim in his later essay "Le origini e l'idea fondamentale del 
pragmatismo," published in Rivista di psicologia applicata in 1909 
(in SF: 331-46). But the peculiarity of Vailati's development of a 
philosophy of science (and ultimately of a philosophy oflanguage) 
within the confines of a pragmatic epistemology is that for him 
the premises, postulates, and axioms of a theory are treated as 
propositions like other propositions, with no divine right. A theory 
as a concatenated network of premises, conclusions, and lines of 
inference is to be compared to a constitutional or democratic re-
gime where the postulates are temporarily placed in charge to 
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perform certain functions in the public interest, that is, in this 
case, the pursuit of objective knowledge. The distinction between 
premises and conclusions, on this view, is merely functional or 
pragmatic, since in the last analysis all the constituents of the 
theoretical system would be bound together in a mutually self-
implicatory way. 
Vailati' s antifoundationalism is intrinsically connected with 
his pragmatism. For Vailati scientific knowing, while a privileged 
form of knowing, is not based on impregnable intuitions or in-
sights. It consists of a vast web of theses and hypotheses that 
have been developed from sets of simplifying idealizations and 
whose practical (conceptual) consequences have been elaborated 
in the greatest detail by complicated chains of inference. As Vailati 
put it in his review of Duhem's La theorie physique (Sf: 220-22), a 
theory is "un insieme di ipotesi" (Sf: 222), which, while ideally 
confronted with experience as a whole, nevertheless must be put 
to the test in individual cases and, perhaps, sacrificed in parts 
(Sf: 222) in order to save the theory as a whole. Science is a 
systematized form of risk taking, a willingness to fall into error 
for the sake of truth. In this conception of science, Vailati was 
agreeing with Peirce's characterization of the "experimental mind" 
at the beginning of his essay "What Pragmatism Is" (Collected 
Papers, 4.530ft), where the provisional character of premises and 
postulates is meshed with their heuristic fertility. 
A further aspect of this matter, that also looks forward to 
Vailati' s analysis of language, is his assertion that the development 
of modern mechanics and mathematical logic entails the recogni-
tion of the central role of implicit definition or definition by abstraction 
in our ways of talking about and symbolizing the world. The main 
point is: we cannot assign a meaning to isolated words. The key 
words of a theory-"mass," "force," "inertia," and so forth-are 
defined within the contexts of sentences or assertions. They are 
not independent contents of abstracted or abstractable intel-
ligibilities but elements within a complex system of differences, 
connections, and contrasts: 
It is necessary then to admit that a theory, or a collection of hypoth-
eses, can have a meaning even when we cannot properly attribute 
one to the individual parts, or affirmations, that contribute to its 
constitution: in the same way that a phrase can have a determinate 
sense without that being the case for all the words of which it is 
composed, each taken by itself. (SF: 222) 
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Indeed, Vailati thought that many of philosophy's own central 
words also cannot be "defined" directly, but rather than this being 
a license to inflate concepts and theories to no end, pragmatism 
entails a kind of radical surgery while admitting all the time an 
open-ended development of theories and explanatory concepts 
sufficiently flexible and creative to deal with an ever-changing 
and evolving experience, both individual and social. These are 
themes developed in Vailati's essays "11 linguaggio come ostacolo 
alla eliminazione di contrasti illusori" (SF: 325-30) and "II prag-
matismo e i vari modi di non dir niente" (SF: 347-57). 
The pragmatic maxim was formulated by Vailati, echoing 
Peirce, in the following way in his essay "Le origini e l'idea fon-
damentale del pragmatismo" (SF: 331-46): 
the sole means to determine and to clarify the sense of an assertion 
consists in indicating what particular experiences one intends with 
it to affirm will be produced or would be produced, given certain 
circumstances [iZ solo mezzo di determinare e chiarire il senso di una 
asserzione consiste nell'indicare quali esperienze particolari si intenda con 
essa affermare che si produrranno, o si produrrebbero date certe circo-
stanze]. (SF: 331) 
These experiences, however, are by no means subjective. The 
whole point of the maxim is to make assertions more objective 
by subjecting them to a set of constraints and controls. Assertions 
refer essentially to "anticipations or previsions of all sorts" [aspet-
tazioni o previsioni di qualsiasi specie] (SF: 335), and this, Vailati 
shows in an illuminating analysis of some points from Berkeley's 
Theory of Vision, applies even to the beliefs about present facts or 
to facts that have already occurred: 
In his Theory of Vision-which is really a true and authentic theory 
of "prevision"-Berkeley, in opposition to the current opinion ac-
cording to which the size, position, and distance of objects would 
be seen by us in the same way that we see their color, showed 
how our visual sensations are, by themselves, simply incapable of 
furnishing us immediately with such types of information, and that 
the distances, the forms, the dimensions of the objects that we see 
are not "seen" by us but "foreseen," or inferred by the symptoms 
or signs of them that our visual sensations, in the real sense of the 
term, furnish us with. 
The distances, the forms, the dimensions are, that is, in a certain 
sense, read and interpreted by us in a process analogous to that 
with which we manage to read and to interpret any other species 
of "signs" 3; we can be said, for example, to see the genius or the 
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stupidity of a person when we read something they have written. 
(SF: 335) 
Berkeley's esse est percipi really means esse est posse percipi (SF: 
336). Vailati accepts this "semiotic" analysis as equivalent to a 
"pragmatic" analysis. The existence or non-existence of a thing 
boils down to the possible existence of determinate experiences 
(SF: 336), which can come to us or which we can provoke by our 
voluntary actions. 4 These previsioni are contained in our beliefs 
and do not have to be actualized or made explicit except in cases 
when our beliefs are interrupted or we fall into doubt. Vailati is 
here, as in many other places, a faithful interpreter and presenter 
of the Peircean theses, pointing out the wide range of conse-
quences that flow from accepting the pragmatic axiom and seeing 
how we can assimilate it to a semiotic analysis of perception, a 
topic Peirce never ceased to deal with in great detail on his own. 
3. THE LINGUISTIC DIMENSION IN VAILATI'S WORK 
Vailati never ceased to occupy himself with language as a 
philosophical problem. On the one hand, his approach was in-
formed through and through by the rhetoric of suspicion 5 (and 
the suspicion of rhetoric), and this brought him into close proxim-
ity to Nietzsche, Peirce, Lady Welby, and Wittgenstein in particu-
lar. Vailati's approach, however, is Socratic rather than Nietzsche-
an or Freudian or Marxist. Philosophy was to put us on our guard 
against pseudo-distinctions and pseudo-abstractions and show us 
"how to make our ideas clear," that is, reveal the ultimate condi-
tions of linguistic meaning (and non-meaning), traced by Vailati 
to pragmatic conditions. On the other hand, philosophical reflec-
tion on language had also a descriptive and a constructive task: 
to perform a phenomenological inventory of our language forms 
and concepts and to delineate the various logical grammars of our 
expressive means . I want to focus here, though not exclusively, 
on the latter task, as exemplified in two substantial and fresh 
essays, "I tropi della logica," which, with a semantic orientation, 
deals with metaphors of mental processes, and "La grammatica 
dell' algebra," which, in the syntactic mode, examines the structure 
of algebra from the linguistic point of view. 
"I tropi della logica" (SF: 195-203) is not only a piece of sub-
stantive language-analytical philosophizing in its own right, but 
it also points ahead to and compares favorably with the type of 
analyses undertaken much later by Wittgenstein and Ryle, within 
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the tradition of analytic philosophy, and by George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson in recent years in their provocative discussions of 
the ubiquity of metaphor and of metaphorical constructions of 
"the mind. "6 
Taking deduction [il dedurre], the logical operation par excel-
lence, as his object of analysis, Vailati asks whether we de facto 
schematize it according to diverse images and, if so, what they 
are. Answering in the positive to the first question, Vailati distin-
guishes three root metaphors, each of which represents one as-
pect, or system of aspects, of this paradigmatic "processo mentale": 
1) appoggiolsostegno [support/prop], 2) contenere/includere [contain-
ing/including], and 3) salire!scendere [ascending/descending]. 
The first group of metaphors focuses on the classical role of 
deduction as "a means of making our knowledge certain" [ un 
mezzo di accertamento delle nostre cognizioni]. But, on the classical 
view, certitude is dependent on the certitude of the premises, to 
which the conclusion is attached by a thread ffilo] of argument. 
Certitude is transmitted in a straight line, so to speak, from prem-
ises to conclusions. It literally "depends" on the premises, hangs 
from them. Greek science, logic, and geometry shared the same 
ideal of deductive system and gave cognitive priority to the system 
of premises, axioms, or postulates from which the process of 
deduction started out (the theme of "Il metodo deduttivo ... "). 
The validity of the premises and their mutual coherence came 
either from their self-evidence or from the fact that they did not 
give rise to contradictory conclusions. At the same time, however, 
the images of "appoggio" or "sostegno" define a schema of "sup-
port," of premises as the "base" or "foundation" upon which the 
conclusions "rest." Greek thought was obsessed with the problem 
of foundations, especially in deductive systems, where, it was 
thought, the ideal of the human mind was most exemplified. 
While, to be sure, deduction was a process, and hence a develop-
ment in time, it was the completed process, as exemplified in a 
unified set of properly related propositions, that the Greeks most 
admired. Hence, Plato's praise of geometry, the cultural influence 
of Euclid's elements, and so forth, in spite of Aristotle's own 
contributions to rhetoric and what is now called informal logic. 
Vailati points out that this image does not correspond to the 
new view of deduction as it has been revealed in the rise of modern 
mechanics and in modern mathematical logic. Premises and con-
clusions are joined together by "mutual attraction," mutual depen-
dency. The process of deduction is likened to a group of Alpinisti 
joined together by a rope (SF: 199). Deduction is much more like 
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an explication [spiegazione] than a demonstration [dimostrazione] in 
modern scientific systems, because the premises and axioms have 
no permanently privileged status, but play their role within a 
constitutional or democratic realm. Going beyond his claim that 
induction is "a reasoning process without foundations" [un 
ragionamento senza fondamenti] (SF: 374, n4), Vailati would seem to 
imply that deduction itself, as it functions within the realm of the 
idealizing physical sciences and in modern mathematical logic, is 
more a means of discovering just what a theory or set of hypoth-
eses mean, or could imply, with respect to their bearing on experi-
ence, than a device for insuring the certitude of a process of 
reasoning, or finding a rock-solid base. The aim of modern science 
is understanding, not certainty. Here Vailati parallels exactly, it 
seems to me, the view of science proposed by Peirce and worked 
out by Dewey in his The Quest for Certainty and Logic: The Theory 
of Inquiry. Theories are organisms for Vailati, whose parts are 
mutually dependent and tied together by intelligible bonds dis-
cerned by inferential processes which could begin at any place in 
the organism. 
The second group of operative metaphors, found in the pair 
contenerelincludere, thinks of conclusions as implied by premises or 
the premises as contained in the conclusion, in fact, explicating the 
conclusion that is deduced from it. By relying upon this schemati-
zation, Vailati points out that we are led to think of deduction as 
the extraction from premises of what they already contain, of what 
is implicit in them . Deduction is a cognitive movement from the 
implicit to the explicit. But what, we might ask, happens to the 
cognitive status of the conclusion if it is already "in" the premises? 
How is a conclusion "in" its premises? Aristotle tried to answer 
this question by having recourse to an analogy based on the con-
trast between form and matter. Deduction, in his view, is likened 
to the work of a sculptor who releases the figure from the block 
of marble. Vailati, for his part, modifies, in an enlightening way, 
the analogy, by pointing out that the deductive process, so under-
stood within this image schema, should be compared rather to 
the production of a lens [lente] or a dagger [pugnale]. This shift in 
the metaphor illustrates the greater and deeper cultural shift in 
the cognitive role of deduction: from the explication of what is 
already there to an instrument for seeing, by means of the theory, 
what would otherwise be inaccessible (the lens metaphor) or for 
penetrating (the dagger metaphor) to the inside. It is in this light 
that we are to understand Vailati's comment about "the task of 
deduction as the organizing activity of our knowledge in view of 
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the attainment of determinate ends, not excluded, it is understood, 
that of leading to the quest for acquiring new knowledge" (SF: 
200). Hence, deduction has a properly heuristic role to play in the 
development and organization of knowledge. 
Vailati has a view of deduction as active, contrasting it with 
other purely or predominantly passive operations (in his view) of 
observation, contemplation, or registration of the data of experi-
ence or of intuition. Deduction must be likened to a conscription 
[coscrizione] rather than to a census [censimento] (SF: 201). 
But there is even more to the container image. It allows us 
to think of premises as simpler than the conclusions, as, in fact, 
the elements out of which the conclusions are composed. It is in 
effect a chemical analogy, and is latent even in Euclid's Elements 
and in Plato's Theatetus (206-08), where the fundamental principles 
of the various sciences are likened to the letters of the alphabet. 
In Vailati's view, however, the weakness of the chemical image 
is that it exaggerates the role of simple truths over against complex 
truths and creates the supreme ideal of scientific research as the 
determination of truths absolutely primordial, indecomposable, 
atomic [primordiali, indecomponibili, atomiche], "fit to generate all 
the others by means of their different groupings" (SF: 201). This 
is the Leibnizian ideal that likens truth to numbers. 
To this ideal Vailati opposes an essentially pragmatic one. 
Simplicity and complexity, he points out, are extremely relative, 
depending on the goal of the affirmation, where it is uttered, 
weight of the treatment of which it is a part, etc. (SF: 201-02). 
Indeed, going further, Vailati argues that whether a proposition 
is demonstrable or a concept definable depends, in the one case, 
on what premises one accepts or, in the other case, on what other 
concepts one supposes as given (SF: 202). It is this shifting nature 
of the premises and of the concepts that reveals just how indebted 
Vailati is to his study of the history of science.7 
The third group of metaphors, based on the image-schema 
of ascending/descending [salire/scendere], encompasses both de-
duction and definition, the latter of which is often represented as 
consisting in the ascent from particular intuitions to more general 
concepts under which the particulars fall (SF: 202), an echo, as is 
obvious, of the Porphyrian tree. 8 Vailati points out that metaphors 
of groups two and three share the notion that deduction involves 
passing from the general to the particular and that the upshot of 
definition can also be a movement from a more general notion to 
a particular notion (SF: 203). Hence, Vailati seems to be himself 
thinking in terms of an organism or of a web . These are, it is 
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apparent, themselves very powerful metaphors and images. 
Comparing the metaphor of rischiaramento [Erkliirung], which 
is a light metaphor, with that of salire, Vailati points out that the 
latter has the advantage of foregrounding not only seeing, but 
commanding and power, "come quando si parla di alture dalle 
quali si domina una data regione" [a commanding view] (SF: 203). 
There are, it is clear, many different heights, with relative advan-
tages and disadvantages. 
These exemplary analyses of the language of the mind, of 
those root metaphors that not only pre-structure our pictures of 
ourselves but also the procedures we use to structure our world 
and to set cognitional goals for ourselves, are heuristically fertile 
and permanently valid contributions to the hermeneutics of knowl-
edge and illustrate the power of a linguistic phenomenology to 
contribute to an analysis of mental processes. 
4. THE GRAMMAR OF ALGEBRA 
The principal focus of Vailati's philosophical work was, as 
we have seen, twofold: an analysis of the significance of modern 
scientific methods and an analysis of the importance of language 
for philosophical reflection as a whole. The core of his approach 
to language was fundamentally semantic, for it was through the 
concepts carried by languages that human beings gained control 
over their world and entered into cooperative arrangements in 
social life, steering and evaluating both their technical and their 
ethical actions with respect to ends in view. 
While the analysis exemplified in "I tropi dell logica" is reso-
lutely semantic in orientation and in method, the groundbreaking 
essay "La grammatica dell'algebra" (SF: 304-24) offers us a precise 
and illuminating comparative account of the syntactic structures 
of algebra and natural languages. In it Vailati touches upon issues 
dear to general semiotics, whose principal goal is the description, 
classification, and comparison of sign systems of every sort. 
What does an analysis of algebra, from the "grammatical" or 
"language" point of view, tell us? 
The foundation of the comparison is that while other sign 
systems, such as the ideographic, which bypass phonetic repre-
sentations may not have "words" in the strict sense of the term, 
their elements perform the same functions. These second types 
of writing systems utilize alterations in the form, or in the order 
of signs, to perform the analogous functions of natural languages 
realized by inflexions, prepositions, signs of predication and of 
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interrogation, conjunctions, and so forth. Algebra, music, as well 
as other ideographic systems, while engaging in a kind of compe-
tition with natural languages, resort to various expedients and 
have a special character all their own, which, in the case of algebra, 
is not to be restricted to the brevity and precision of algebraic 
notation with respect to numbers or to quantjties. 
Besides its advantage as a means of expression, the language 
of algebra, Vailati notes, is advantageous as an instrument of 
research and of proof (SF: 305). But, unlike the signs of arithmetic 
and music-which Vailati groups together as "nomenclatures" 
rather than languages and whose tasks are the description and 
decomposition into their elements of given groups of sensations 
or of complex actions-algebra and its semiotic partner chemical 
notation can enunciate true and authentic propositions (that is, 
propositions with objective reference) and deduce their conse-
quences (SF: 306). 
The first point of comparison focuses on the parts of speech 
(SF: 307ft). Vailati agrees with Max Muller that "language begins 
where the interjections end" [il linguaggio comincia dove le interiezioni 
finiscono] (SF: 307). Interjections are "full" of meaning in them-
selves and have no syntactic bond with other interjections. This 
syntactic bond, Vailati points out, is crucial for the joining of 
names, adjectives, verbs, and so forth to make phrases and prop-
ositions. Merely mentioning the name of an object, without joining 
it to other words in a syntactic matrix, is insufficient to determine 
what we intend to say. Vailati was very aware of the necessity of 
a syntactic field, in Buhler's sense, or of a linguistic situation, in 
Wegener's and Gardiner's sense, wherein the single linguistic 
units had to be set in order to do their work. 9 
This is extremely clear in the case of prepositions, which 
"mean" nothing without the addition of other words (SF: 308). 
Thus, "above," "beside," "after," and so forth always open up 
what Karl Buhler called Leerstellen, or empty slots, which have to 
be filled by other linguistic units. There are nouns and adjectives 
that also demand complements in order to signify: "coetaneo" [con-
temporary of], "compaesano" [fellow countryman of], "maggiore" 
[greater than], "posteriore" [following upon] (SF: 309). "Nomi re-
lativi" have a "transitive" character, analogous to the transitive 
character of verbs, with which they have the further factor in 
common that they can be translated into verbal form. "So and so 
is the enemy of such and such" [II tale e nemico del tale altro] or 
"this object is higher than another object" [il tale oggetto e piu alto 
del tale altro] can be translated into "one person hates another 
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person" [la tale persona odia la tale altra] or" a certain object surpasses, 
or goes beyond, another object" [il tale oggetto supera, o sopravanza, 
il tale altro], and so forth (SF: 309-10). Vailati explicitly refers to 
Peirce's theory of relations: bivalent, trivalent, and so forth (biva-
lent: insegnare [to teach], maestro [teacher/master], donatore [donor]; 
trivalent: vendere [to sell], comperare [to buy]) (SF: 310). In pluriva-
lent verbs, which are multiply transitive, the prepositions perform 
the role of connecting organs. To be sure, Vailati points out, the 
increasing number of "valences" governing the relation of verbs 
and complements would lead to ambiguities if there did not appear 
on the scene prepositions (or inflections) corresponding to the 
diverse "cases" of nouns. Telegraphic speech (addresses, financial 
statements, etc.) dispenses with them, however. "Spedite plico se-
gretario" [ send the packet to the secretary] is clear by reason of 
the semantic content of the words. But in the case of "dico male 
di Tizio a Caio" [I am maligning Titius to Caius], "dico male a Caio 
di Tizio," the dropping of the prepositions would make the sen-
tences completely ambiguous (SF: 310-11). 
Using the above points of reference as his analytical notions, 
Vailati subjects algebra to a grammatical analysis. 
The first point to note about the special grammatical and 
syntactical characters of the language of algebra is the absence of 
intransitive verbs (SF: 311). The signs of equality or inequality are 
the equivalents of transitive verbs, and without them we have 
only "expressioni algebriche," not propositions. Such algebraic ex-
pressions as a+b, axb, a-b [la somma di a con b, il prodotto di a 
per b, la differenza tra a e b] are of the same structure as the 
linguistic expressions ''l'urto di un corpo con un altro" [the impact 
of one body with another], "il disprezzo di una persona per un'altra" 
[the denigration of one person by another], "la distanza tra un 
punto e un altro" [the distance between one point and another], 
and so forth, which function as relative nouns [nomi relativi]. So, 
the signs of equality and inequality, with the help of the signs of 
operations (addition, subtraction, etc.), exercise not just the func-
tions of bivalent verbs but also those of any number of valences, 
and thus are able to express relations between many numbers, 
helped by the important device of parentheses (SF: 311-13). 
The transitive verb character of algebraic signs is not their 
only defining property. They have the property of "syllogistic 
transitivity" (SF: 314ft). If, for example, A is a concittadino [fellow 
citizen] of B and B is a concittadino of C, then A is a concittadino of 
C. This is not the case with creditore [creditor]. The verbal signs 
of algebra(=,<,>) have this property. The axiom "two quantities 
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equal to a third are equal to one another" is the fundamental 
principle of algebra, which has been extended to cover and to 
subject to algebraic treatment non-mathematical or non-numerical 
relations (SF: 315). 
Vailati points out that language often expresses the relation 
of two objects to one another by specifying the diverse points of 
view in which they are equal, or unequal (SF: 316-17). Two persons 
can be "equal in stature," two buildings "equal in height," two 
climates "equal in health." While, we-in English and Italian, 
say-use the preposition "in," Greek and Latin, for example, use 
the accusative and the ablative, respectively. So, such expressions 
as sine a= sine b, area ABC= area DEF are the algebraic equivalents 
of such sentences as "the stature of person so-and-so is equivalent 
to the stature of some other person," and so on (SF: 317). 
Algebra also avails itself of implicit definitions. While sine 
functions are defined explicitly, areas are defined implicitly, by 
"definition by abstractions." Vailati refers to the Greek use of 
logos-translated by him as "rapporto"-in Euclid, as in "le tali due 
grandezze hanno lo stesso rapporto delle tali altre due" or "il rapporto 
tra tali due quantita e equale a (o maggiore, o minore di) quello tra 
le tali altre due quantita. 11 Proportions, then, and proportional rela-
tions, exemplify implicit definitions (SF: 317-18). 
Transitivity and commutativity do not always go together, 
though in th2 case of the definition of equality they do, and also 
in the definition of perpendicularity or parallelism. "Divisibility," 
however, does not share this property. That one number is divis-
ible by another does not mean that the other is also divisible by 
the first (SF: 318-19). 
In definition by abstraction, terms are defined by their use in 
expressions or propositions and are not free-standing units. Exam-
ples cited by Vailati: giudicare a una data stregua [to judge according 
to a certain standard], andare in solluchero [to go into rapture], 
averne a iosa [to have something galore), andare a zonzo [to loaf, or 
to loiter or to saunter), di primo acchito [at first sight, at once). 
Another example: the exchange value of something [il valore di 
scambio] is defined in relational rather than absolute terms. But it 
is clear that it is the great use of implicit definition in algebra and 
mathematics that distinguishes it so clearly from ordinary lan-
guage (SF: 320). 
This inability (or non-necessity) to define explicitly what one 
is talking about has, for Vailati, implications far outside the realm 
of algebra and mathematics. While the decomposition of concepts 
by means of a specification of their elements has a certain useful-
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ness in pedagogical situations, with which Vailati was much con-
cerned, the term to be defined is perhaps best grasped or taught 
through direct observation of the facts or the relations which it is 
being used to express, through, that is, paradigmatic examples. 
This is also, in Vailati's view, the way of cutting short the intermin-
able discussions on "time," "space," "substance," and the "infinite" 
(SF: 321ft). 
Algebra uses the aforementioned means-the transitive ver-
bal forms of =, < , >, nouns represented by numbers and vari-
ables, operation signs ( +, - , x, ...,.. )-to express isolated proposi-
tions. But in algebra, just as in natural language, we form chains 
of expressions in order to express relations of dependence or 
independence. Natural language uses conjunctions, which per-
form, with respect to propositions, what prepositions do with 
respect to nouns . But unlike natural languages, algebra has need 
of only one conjunctive sign to express consequence, represented 
by the word "therefore ." In addition to consequence, however, 
it needs three other signs: for negation, for conjunction ("and"), 
and for disjunction ("or"), which are, of course, coin of the realm 
of symbolic logic, too (SF: 322-23). 
Vailati clearly saw as one of the tasks of a systematic 
philosophy of language to study the "various systems of ideo-
graphic notations used in modern science, for example, in 
geometry, in chemistry, in kinematics, not to speak of the repre-
sentational procedures used by geography and the diagrams used 
by statistics" (SF: 323).10 In his opinion, the study of "artificial 
signs" merits just as much attention as the study of the signs of 
"natural" languages that have been adapted to different ends and 
sharpened by many voluntary and individual factors. 
Vailati closes his essay with some further reflections on the 
pedagogical implications of what he has tried to do. The emphasis 
on explicit definition in both the teaching of languages and the 
teaching of algebra is deleterious. Both should be grounded in 
exercises of interpretation and conversation. Here is, Vailati 
thinks, a real chance for mutually beneficial exchange between 
the two putatively separate domains, the literary and the scientific. 
Vailati has clearly shown that algebra has a grammar and a 
syntax, which systematizes a set of elements that correspond to 
the linguistic elements of nouns, transitive verbs, conjunctions, 
and prepositions . Implicit definition, or definition by abstraction, 
is the rule in algebra. As a study of relations it proceeds best by 
paradigmatic example, by exemplification. In fact, from the 
pedagogical side, algebra and the teaching of language have much 
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in common, for they are most successful when they do not rely 
on explicit definitions, but on the strategy of forcing the "seeing 
of connections," in Wittgenstein's sense. Hence, in this essay, as 
well as in many others, Vailati has produced a piece of compara-
tive, general semiotics and a piece of pedagogical advice at the 
same time. 
5. PHILOSOPHY AND THE RHETORIC OF SUSPICION 
By foregrounding "the unconscious subjection of thought to 
language in the various fields of intellectual activity" [l'inconscia 
schiavitu del pensiero alla parola nei vari campi d' attivita intellettuale] 
(SF: 117), Vailati anticipated, in spirit and in content, much later 
work in the language-analytic tradition. While the analysis found 
in "I tropi della logica" is a kind of linguistic phenomenology and 
that found in "La grammatica dell'algebra" belongs to comparative 
semiotics, many of Vailati's essays and reviews belong to the 
critique of language and to the problem space of the rhetoric of 
suspicion. 
Vailati's analysis of this theme, which runs through his work 
from start to finish, is illuminated quite clearly by an analogy with 
which he begins his essay "11 linguaggio come ostacolo alla 
eliminazione di contrasti illusori" (SF: 325-30). Just as we are born 
into a society we have not created and are subjected to its rules, 
obligations, and rights, so our assimilation of a language as a 
system of distinctions and classifications strictly limits, as well as 
makes possible, our field or power of expression. Vailati notes that 
Galileo had to fight, for example, against the obstacles embedded 
in traditional language--distinctions between natural and violent 
movement, between terrestrial and celestial phenomena, between 
naturally heavy and naturally light bodies, between essentially 
hot and essentially cold bodies, between intrinsically good and 
intrinsically bad conductors of heat, and so forth (SF: 326). These 
distinctions, with all their conceptual baggage, belonged to that 
traditional "rete" inherited by Galileo, the freeing from which, at 
least partially, was necessary for him to create the new science of 
mechanics . The "linguaggio comune" and the "linguaggio ordinario" 
(SF: 327) contained also the results of past theoretical decisions, 
which had to be reformed. Both science itself and philosophy were 
to perform this task. In fact, the critical function of philosophy 
arises at this point and gives to Vailati's work on language, at 
least in this respect, its distinctively "Socratic" character. This is 
evident in the following pregnant text. 
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That part especially of philosophy that has as its object the analysis 
and criticism of the fundamental concepts and criteria of knowing 
and acting demands to be, so to say, rethought in every succeeding 
generation; otherwise it runs the risk of losing all its efficacy and 
of ending up damaging, rather than helping, those who undergo 
in a passive way its influence. 
The processes that lead to the elimination of the distinctions that 
are gradually coming to be recognized as superfluous or unjustifi-
able are no less necessary for the healthy development of scientific 
and philosophical thought than is, for the life of the body, the nor-
mal and non-interrupted activity of the organs of secretion. (SF: 328) 
This is truly an "eliminative" conception of philosophy, but unlike 
certain strands of analytic philosophy, Vailati did not think that 
philosophy as such would pass away once it had resolved or 
dissolved the knots in our understanding that linguistic problems 
or scientific problems have produced. For the descriptive role of 
philosophy, its task of reflecting upon the logical grammars of 
our various means of expression, is never repudiated by Vailati, 
who, in this respect, remains a critical pragmatist. 
In his essay "11 pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente" 
(SF: 347-57), Vailati illustrated the nature and scope of his critical 
pragmatism . It is truly a "language-critical essay," paralleling 
many of analytic philosophy's procedures as well as its tone. In 
this essay Vailati classified four types of propositions as "not say-
ing anything": 1) those that have become "true by definition" (as 
when originally synthetic propositions have been transformed 
into analytic propositions: e.g., the transformation of the law of 
inertia into a conventional axiom); 2) those that have become "false 
by definition"; 3) those that have been constructed within a "pro-
cesso di generalizzazione" whose role as means for given logical or 
practical ends has been forgotten; 4) those that take for an expla-
nation propositions that merely reformulate other propositions 
(opium facit dormire quia habet virtutem dormitivam-Comte's 
"metaphysical explanations"). 
Terms such as "tagliare nel vuoto" [to cut in the void] (SF: 213) 
and "spostamento" [shifting, Vailati's own English word] show the 
affinity between Vailati's inner motivation and the trajectory in-
stantiated in Wittgenstein's work. Language for Vailati can "spin 
its wheels" and" go on holiday ." One part of Vailati' s philosophical 
effort is to determine just when this is so, so that the various 
knots and entanglements of our intellect in language can be cut 
and unloosed . In this, philosophy would be oriented to diminish-
ing distinctions, to clearing the linguistic thicket, to opening a 
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space wherein real sense can be expressed and controlled. Another 
part of Vailati's effort is to "fare aumentare le distinzioni" [to cause 
distinctions to increase]. This is necessary in order to do justice 
tc, the reality coming to articulation in the language, which other-
wise might be cloaked by a defective articulation. Distinctions, 
then, are not only resolved in philosophy but also generated. 
In his essay "La caccia alle antitesi" (SF: 210-19), Vailati 
specifies three types of procedures for generating and resolving 
distinctions and tries to show that the attack often does not abolish 
a distinction, but establishes it in a different context and framework, 
with a different theoretical bite. 
The first approach holds that there is no precise line of demar-
cation between the groups of facts presumed to be distinct and 
that one passes from the one to the other by means of intermediate 
stages or gradations. But in this case, Vailati points out, distinc-
tions are actually multiplied. The discussion of determinism and 
contingency, for example, exemplifies this category and avails 
itself of this procedure. 
The second approach contends that the properties that are 
supposed to be distinct are possessed by both classes, or by neither 
of them. This approach, Vailati notes, only succeeds in putting 
in better light the distinct properties, as happened in the case of 
those who criticized the notion of cause. Sometimes the iine of 
demarcation is shifted (spostamento) [spostamento dolle distinzioni], 
or one adds a second line of demarcation to it, or one just segments 
the field, as in the distinction between apparenza (fenomeno) and 
realta (essenza, noumeno). Such is also the distinction between 
egoism and altruism. Discussions about the differences between 
quantity and quality belong here. 
The third procedure of attempting to abolish distinctions is 
exemplified in the erroneous tendency to "interpret a phrase that 
expresses a relation among many objects as if it had to have a 
meaning for each one of them taken separately" (SF: 215). Another 
example is the case of the law of inertia in mechanics, which only 
makes sense when we specify the spatio-temporal references 
within which the uniform rectilinear movement of a body occurs. 
Inertia in itself does not exist any more than the application of 
the term "antecedent" or "successor" to numbers is an absolute 
ascription. The same number can be both, just as a city can be 
both "east" and "west." 
So, for Vailati, philosophy is caught between the two poles 
of generating and abolishing distinctions. In this sense it is a 
linguistic exercise that straddles the fence between the Scholastic 
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maxim of distingue frequenter, which pursues the path of differ-
ences, and the traditional philosophical task of finding general 
concepts, universals, the absolute. 
Philosophy, as practiced by Vailati, is an activity that forms 
and cultivates the critical powers of the person engaged in it, 
generating new mental habits. Its focus is a reflection upon cog-
nitive methods, a clarification of concepts, a determination of the 
conditions of sense, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Vailati's 
work encompassed historical epistemology, linguistic phenomenol-
ogy, comparative semiotics, and a sense-critical pragmatic analysis. 
Rejecting the road of oracular and monological philosophy, Vailati 
embedded philosophy in the web of cultural discourse as a whole, 
with which it intersected, both theoretically and practically, at just 
about every point. And it is this comprehensiveness, combined with 
an authentic modesty about philosophy's powers, that makes Vai-
lati' s work a model for us as well as a permanent source of insight. 
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